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July-August, 1957
OIL AND GAS RIGHTS IN RAILROAD RIGHTS OF
WAY - THE UNION PACIFIC CASE
By PAULINE NELSON
Pauline Nelson is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
This note received second prize in the writing competition sponsored by
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.
The status of oil and gas rights in railroad rights of way has
been a matter of controversy for fifty years, and a troublesome
question for federal oil and gas lessees since the enactment of the
Mineral Leasing Act in 1920. United States v. Union Pacific R.R.
Co.' has settled the question between the United States and the
Union Pacific. But the case has created more problems than it has
solved, and while the rights of the railroad have been determined,
there are other contenders whose interests are undecided.
In the Union Pacific case the Court held the railroad is not the
owner of the mineral estate in the right of way granted to it by the
Act of July 1, 1862.2 The decision was based upon what the Court
found to be a reservation of minerals to the United States. Section 2
of the 1862 act gave the railroad company "the right of way through
the public lands,' and Section 3 subsidized construction of the road
by a grant of alternate sections on either side of the right of way,
with the proviso that "all mineral lands shall be excepted from the
operation of this act." The mineral exception, the Court held, ap-
plied not only to Section 3 but to the entire act, and hence applied
to the right of way as well as to the subsidy lands.
Until this decision the mineral land exceptions in railroad land
grants were not construed as mineral reservations. The subsidy sec-
tions given to the railroads were those sections not known to contain
minerals at the time the patents issued. The mineral or non-mineral
character of the land was determined by the Interior Department
before issuance of the patent, and the administrative determina-
tion was final. The railroad's title could not be upset by a sub-
sequent discovery of minerals in the patented sections, and if such
minerals were found they belonged to the railroad.3 This was not a
reservation of minerals, but a classification of land, with a convey-
ance only of those sections classified as non-mineral.
The same mineral exception is now held to be a mineral reser-
vation also. The Court in applying the exception has made a distinc-
tion between the alternate sections and the right of way. The
exception is held to apply to both; but the classification method
used in applying it to the alternate sections is not workable in deal-
ing with the right of way, and the proviso must therefore be
interpreted, where the right of way is concerned, as a mineral
reservation. The right of way grant, therefore, conveyed the sur-
face only, with the minerals reserved to the United States.
The decision is in keeping with the rule that a grant of land
by the sovereign must be construed strictly against the grantee,
77 Sup. Ct. 685 (1957).
12 Stat. 489, amended 13 Stat. 356 (1864).
3 Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669 (1914).
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and that nothing will pass by inference or implication unless
essential to the use of the thing granted.4 It is also generally stated
that in construing such a grant there must be considered not only
the language of the act itself but other Congressional acts and the
apparent governmental policy of the time.5 In this case the Court has
applied these rules perhaps with greater rigor than in any other
land grant case. While Congress in 1862 followed a policy of holding
back mineral lands, none of the public land acts of that time con-
tained any reservations. It may be said the Court has considered
not only the policy of the time but the wisdom that comes after-
wards, and has read into an 1862 act a Congressional policy of
separating the surface and mineral estates and reserving minerals
to the United States--a policy in fact not fully developed until the
early years of the 20th century.6
The result reached is more favorable to the United States than
any of the prior oil and gas cases arising under the railroad acts.
This is the third case in the federal courts in which the United
States has sought to enjoin a railroad from drilling for and removing
oil and gas from its right of way. In the first, the Great Northern
case 7it was held that under the General Right of Way Act of 18758
4 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942); Caldwell v. United States, 250
U.S. 14 (1919); United States v. Oregon & C. R.R. Co., 164 U.S. 526 (1896); Barden v. Northern Pac.
R.R. Co.. 154 U.S. 288 (1894).
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 (1875).
SStatutes enacted in 1909 and 1910 (35 Stat. 844; 36 Stat. 583) permitted agricultural entrymen
on land subsequently found to'contain minerals to obtain patents with minerals reserved. The policy
of reserving minerals was first generally applied in the Surface Patent Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 509, and
the Stockraising Homestead Act, 39 Stat. 862 (1916), 43 U.S.C. 291-302 (1952).
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
8 18 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C. 934-39 (1952).
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the railroad acquired nothing more than an easement-a right of
use and occupancy-and hence had no right in the underlying
minerals. In the second, the Illinois Central case9 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that under its specefic right
of way grant ° the railroad received a "determinable fee" in the
right of way, and that the interest granted included the mineral
rights. The Union Pacific case reaches still a third result. What-
ever the nature of the railroad's interest, the Court says, there was
a specific reservation of minerals to the United States.
The difference in result in the three cases is traceable to their
different statutory bases, and reflects the changing public land
policy of the United States in the second half of the 19th century.
Prior to 1860 the government made a number of railroad grants, giv-
ing to the railroads a right of way across public lands and a bonus
consisting of alternate sections of land on either side of the right of
way.- There was no exception of mineral lands in these acts. The
Illinois Central grant was probably the largest in this period. By the
1850 act the railroad received a right of way 200 feet wide, and every
alternate section of public land, whether mineral or non-mineral,
for a width of six sections on each side of the right of way.
The period from 1860 to 1871 was a period of lavish grants in aid
of the transcontinental railroads. As an inducement for the construc-
tion of roads across thousands of miles of vacant territory, millions
of acres of public land were given to the Union Pacific, the Northern
Pacific, and other railroads. 1 2 The total has been estimated at more
than 158 million acres. " But while Congress was prodigal in dealing
with the railroads, there also developed an increasing jealousy of
the nation's mineral resources. All the railroad grants of this period,
like other public land acts, excepted mineral lands.
In the period after 1871 the Congressional attitude toward the
railroads changed. The prodigality ceased. There continued to be
grants of right of way across the public domain,' 4 but there were no
more gifts of public lands adjoining the railroad route. The General
Right of Way Act of 1875"1 put an end to grants by special act of
Congress, and delegated authority to the Interior Department. The
act embodied the policy of the special acts of the early 1870's that
railroads should be subsidized only to the extent of the necessary
rights of way, and provided that public lands should be disposed of
subject to such rights of way.
Until the time of the oil and gas cases all right of way grants,
under whatever act of Congress they were made, received a uniform
interpretation in the courts. It was held that the nature of the rail-
road's use of its right of way precluded a holding that the right of
way was an intangible right of passage only; that since the use was
continuous and involved permanent improvements, a grant of right
of way to a railroad required the fee for its enjoyment. But since
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 187 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1951), affirming 89 F. Supp. 17
(ED. III. 1949).
0 Act of September 20, 1850, 9 Stat. 466.
U1 Atlantic and Gulf, and Mobile 'and Ohio grants, 9 Stat. 771-72 (1849); Illinois Central grant,
9 Stat. 466 (1850).
'Among others, the Union Pacific grant, 12 Stat. 489 (1862); Northern Pacific, 13 Stat. 365
(1864); Cali onia and Oregon R.R., 14 Stat. 239 (1866); Atlantic and Pacific R.R., 14 Stat. 292 (1866).
18See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 77 Sup. Ct. at 692.
14 Portland, Dalles & S.L.R.R. grant, 17 Stat. 52 (1872); Central Pacific grant, 18 Stat. 306 (1875).
15 18 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C. 934-39 (1952).
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the grant was made for the purpose of construction and operation
of a railroad, it did not convey an unqualified fee simple title, but a
"fee simple determinable, sometimes called a base, qualified or
limited fee,"'" subject only to the condition that in the event the
land ceased to be used for railroad purposes it would revert to the
United States.
In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend17 the Court held the land
forming the right of way was taken out of the category of public
lands and was not subject to further disposition by the government.
An adjoining landowner could acquire, no rights in it, either by
adverse possession or by virtue of a patent covering the entire legal
subdivision.
Most of the cases interpreting the right of way acts involved
the land-grant railroads and right of way acts of the pre-1871
period. But in a decision later overruled by the Great Northern case
the Court applied the same reasoning to the General Right of Way
Act. The right of way acquired under the provisions of that act was
held to be not a mere easement but a determinable fee.' t
Did a grant of this character also convey to the railroad the
mineral rights in the right of way land? The question arose as early
10 New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898).
1' 190 U.S. 267 (1903). See also Stuart v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 342 (1913) ;Clairmont v.
United States, 225 U.S. 551 (1912); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114 (1894); St.
Joseph & D.C.R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426 (1881); Barnes v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.2d
100 (9th Cir. 1926); City of Reno v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 268 Fed. 751 (9th Cir. 1920); Holland v.
Northern Poc. Ry. Co.,214 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Davenport, 102 Ken. 513,
170 Pac. 993 (1918).
"- Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Stringhom, 239 U.S. 44 (1915).
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as 1905, and the Interior Department then adopted a position it has
adhered to consistently ever since. A right of way grant to a rail-
road, it held, was for railroad purposes only; the grantee and its
lessees had no rights in the underlying minerals and could not drill
for and remove oil and gas.'"
This position of the Department was contrary to most of the
decided cases interpreting determinable fee titles. Such a title,
courts have held, gives the owner rights equivalent to those of an
owner in fee simple, except that his fee may be defeated by the
occurrence of the contingency by which it is determined.0 The
estate is a fee because it may last forever; it is determinable because
it may end on the happening of the contingency. It is generally held
the owner has the entire present interest in the land, including the
right to remove timber, stone and minerals. Since the grantor re-
tains nothing more than a possibility of reversion, upon a contin-
gency that may never occur, the removal of minerals is not such
waste as he could enjoin.
2'
The question acquired greater importance after the enactment
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,22 when oil and gas leasing of
public lands brought another party-the federal lessee-into the
controversy. Oil and gas leases covered entire subdivisions, without
excepting the right of way, and the lessees claimed their interests
included the oil and gas under the right of way. The Department,
however, ruled otherwise, holding that neither the federal lessee
nor the owner of the right of way had any right to the minerals in
the right of way strip. Applying the ruling of the Townsend case,
the Department held a lessee, standing in the same position as the
patentee in the Townsend case, could acquire no interest in the right
of way strip, but since the right of way was given for one purpose
only the right of way owner also had no right to remove the
minerals.2'
Because of the impasse thus created-a situation in which no
one could legally drill for oil and gas on a public domain right of
way-the Department sponsored and Congress passed the leasing
act of 1930,24 which authorized the Secretary to grant oil and gas
leases on rights of way-such leases to be given only to the owner
of the right of way, or, upon competitive bidding, to the owner or
lessee of adjoining acreage. And in a number of subsequent decisions
the Department held the railroads could not drill for oil and gas on
a right of way without first acquiring a lease under the 1930 act.
25
The first test of the issue came in the Great Northern case,
which was decided against the railroad-not on the ground a deter-
,' Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 33 L.D. 470 (1905). See also Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 34 L.D. 504
(1906).
90 1 American Law of Property, § 2.6 (1952); 2 Tiffany, Real Property, § 220 (3d ed. 1939).
21 Gannon v. Peterson' 193 Ill. 372, 62 N.E. 210 (1901); Hillis v. Dils, 53 Ind. App. 576, 100 N.E.
1047 (1913); Landers v. Landers, 161 Ky. 800, 151 S.W. 386 (1912); First Universalist Society v.
Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W.
376 (1931); Board v. Nevada School District, 363 Mo. 328, 251 S.W.2d 20 (1952); Davis v. Skipper,
124 Tex. 364, 83 S.W.2d 318 (1935). Contra: Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. United States, 140
F.2d 436(9th Cir. 1944); Union Missionary Baptist Church v. Fyke, 179 Okla. 102, 64 P.2d 1203 (1937).
241 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. 181-263 (1952).
23 Windsor Reservoir & Canci Co. v. Miller, 51 I.D. 27, aff'd on rehearing, 51 I.D. 305 (1925).
The Windsor case involved a reservoir site acquired under the 1891 irrigation act [26 Stat. 1101, 43
U.S.C. 9A6-49 (1952)]. That act also had been interpreted as conveying a determinable fee title.
24 46 Stat. 373, 30 U.S.C. 301-06 (1952).
25!Ownership of Minerals Beneath Land Grant Act Right of Way, 58 I.D. 160 (1942); Use of Rail.
road Right of Way for Extracting Oil, 56 I.D. 206 (1937); Charles A. Son, 53 I.D. 270 (1931).
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minable fee title in the right of way did not include mineral rights,
but on the ground that the right of way grant did not convey the
fee at all. The 1875 act, the Court said, clearly grants only an ease-
ment and not the fee. The Court, however, distinguished the 1875
act from the pre-1871 grants, leaving unaffected the holding that the
prior grants conveyed a greater interest than a mere easement.
Then in the Illinois Central case the Court of Appeals squarely
upset the Department's contention and held the right of way grant,
a determinable fee, conveyed the entire interest in the right of way,
including mineral rights and the right to use the land for any pur-
pose so long as the operation of the railroad continued.
While the Union Pacific decision is based fundamentally on
what the Court finds to be an express reservation of minerals, it
also indicates-in accord with the Department's thesis and contrary
to the Illinois Central case-that a grant for railroad purposes must
be for railroad purposes only. "Whatever may be the nature of the
Union Pacific's interest in the right of way, '26 the Court said, drill-
ing for oil is not a railroad purpose within the meaning of the land
grant act.
The Court did not re-determine the nature of the Union Pacific's
interest. But if it had been determined the right of way is an ease-
ment only, it would have been unnecessary for the Court to find
specific language in the grant reserving the minerals. An easement
is nothing more than a right to use the land for a specific purpose,
and never carries with it the mineral interest. Since the Court did
find a specific reservation of minerals, it is apparent the railroad's
interest is more than a mere easement, and that the "limited fee"
cases are not disturbed. The Court distinguished those cases; it did
not overrule them. None of them, the Court stated, involved a
controversy between the United States and the railroad over min-
eral rights. "The most that the 'limited fee' cases decided was that
the railroads received all surface rights to the right of way and all
rights incident to a use for railroad purposes. '27
It would seem, then, the Union Pacific's interest is just what
the courts have determined it to be since the beginning of the rail-
road litigation, a determinable fee estate, but with the minerals
reserved to the United States. If this is the nature of the railroad's
title, the question then arises as to the effect of subsequent patents
77 Sup. Ct. at 686.
Id. at 689.
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of the land traversed by the right of way. Did a homesteader whose
patent covered the entire quarter section, without excepting the
right of way strip and without a reservation of minerals, thereby
acquire the mineral interest in the right of way?
The Union Pacific case decides nothing more than that the rail-
road has no interest in the minerals. It does not determine title as
between the United States and subsequent patentees. The case is
not like the Great Northern decision, in which judgment deter-
mining title in the United States was limited to those sections of
the right of way crossing land still owned by the United States, and
where a patentee taking land subject to the railroad easement ac-
quired the fee, including the mineral interest, in the right of way.28
The Union Pacific decision leaves open a question that can only be
decided by future litigation.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter indicated that if
mineral rights had not been included in the right of way grant,
those rights would have been conveyed by the patents subsequently
issued for the sections crossed by the right of way.29
Contrary to Justice Frankfurter's opinion, however, is an
Interior Department decision, squarely in point, in which the
Assistant Secretary held the State of Wyoming acquired no interest
in the minerals under the Union Pacific right of way by virtue of
a school land patent covering the entire section.2 0 The Government
may be expected to reaffirm this contention-that it has never
parted with the mineral interest in the right of way, either by the
right of way grant itself or by subsequent patent, and that the
United States is the owner of the mineral rights in the entire length
of the right of way grant.
There are a few cases in which the courts have been faced with
a similar problem, involving not the Government, however, but
individual grantors. Where a person conveys a parcel of land,
reserving the minerals, and in a subsequent conveyance includes a
general description covering the land first conveyed as well as
other land, does the second grantee acquire the reserved mineral
interest? The results of th cases vary, depending in each instance
upon a construction of the deed and a determination of the intent
of the parties.3
Where the government is the grantor, there are additional
factors to be considered. Conveyances under a public land act must
be construed to give effect to the intent of Congress. The act must
2 The Government's claim was not originally limited to that part of the right of way on public
domain. An owner of land adjoining the railroad attempted to intervene in the suit, claiming an
interest in the minerals underlying the right of way on the quarter section patented to his prede-
cessor. The district court refused to permit intervention, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding
his interest was adequately represented by the Government, and whatever issue remained between
the intervener and the Government should be left for future adjudication. MacDonald v. United
States, 119 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1941). In the Supreme Court, however, the Court determined the United
States was not entitled to judgment on the state of the record, which contained no proof that title
to the land was in the United States, but allowed this defect to be cured by stipulation, limiting the
judgment to a tract of land owned by the United States. 315 U.S. at 280.
77 Sup. Ct. at 695.
SO State of Wyoming, 58 I.D. 128 (1942).
u See, e.g., Holloway's Heirs v. Whatley, 133 Tex. 608, 131 S.W.2d 89 (1939); Annot., 123 A.L.R.
848 (1940); 2 American Law of Property, § 10.6 (1952).
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be applied in such a way as to carry out its purposes while still
recognizing the legitimate interest of the public.
32
Where there are exceptions intended for the benefit of the
public the courts have been liberal in interpreting the act in a
manner most favorable to the government. Even where the statute
is silent, as in some of the school land cases, the courts have looked
beyond the statute to precedent and policy and have determined
that mineral land was excepted from a grant which did not in
express terms contain any exceptions; mineral lands were not
included in a grant unless the act expressly so provided23 Having
found a Congressional policy of withholding mineral lands, the
courts held it would be illogical to assume Congress would dispose
of such lands except by statute specifically relating to them. The
same reasoning may be applied to the reserved minerals in a rail-
road right of way.
The solution may depend in the first instance on the rule of the
Townsend case that once the right of way grant took effect that strip
of land was no longer public land and was not subject to further
disposition by the Government. It is true the rule may have been
founded on a belief that the Government had nothing further to
give, while it is now held the Government did have a reserved
mineral interest in the right of way. But the Townsend case dealt
with a claimant under the Homestead Act-a general act concerning
non-mineral public lands. It may be contended whatever interest
the government had in the right of way could not be acquired by
the homesteader. The extent of his interest depends on the statute
under which it was acquired, and that statute did not authorize a
grant to him of the severed mineral estate in the right of way.
It has been stated repeatedly in the public land cases that
'nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit
language.3 4 It is reasonable to conclude that, having once reserved
the mineral estate, the government would not subsequently author-
ize disposition of it except by statute dealing with the reserved
minerals in explicit terms.
If this contention is upheld, the situation is one in which the
1930 leasing act is peculiarly applicable. That act provides the Sec-
retary of the Interior may lease deposits of oil and gas in rights of
way acquired under any law of the United States, "whether the
same be a base fee or mere easement." 5 The legislative history of
the act would indicate it was designed to resolve the situation in
which, because of the nature of the right of way grant, no one could
develop the underlying minerals, with the result the oil might be
drained from beneath the right of way by wells on adjoining land.
If the adjoining land were privately owned there would be a conse-
quent loss of revenue to the government."
This situation could only occur if the Government retained the
mineral interest in the right of way while conveying surface rights
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pvc. Ry. Co., 97 U.S. 491 (1878).
United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918); Ivanhoe Mining Co. v. Keystone Consol. Mining
Co., 102 U.S. 167 (1880).
" E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942), and cases there cited.
146 Stat. 373, 30 U.S.C. 301 (1952).
' The history of this act is discussed in United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 32 F. Supp.
651 (D. Mont. 1940); and in Phillips Petroleum Co., 61 I.D. 93 (1953).
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to the right of way strip and fee simple title to the adjoining lands.
This will be the situation resulting from the Union Pacific decision,
if in fact it is determined the Government did retain the minerals
in the right of way even after the land was patented.
The 1930 act has been described by a court of appeals as "little
more than a self-serving declaration,' 3 7 as it was enacted at a time
when ownership of minerals underlying rights of way had become
a subject of controversy. In eliminating at least a part of the contro-
versy the Union Pacific decision may give the act its justification.
Because of recent interpretations of the act, however, it adds
another facet to the consequences of the Union Pacific decision.
Does the 1930 act also apply to the right of way where the adjoining
land is still public domain? Or does a lease under the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act, on land crossed by the right of way, include the min-
erals underlying the right of way?
Where the Government receives an equal royalty in either
event, it would seem of little consequence to the United States
whether the oil was drained by the 1920 act lessee or by the lessee
of the right of way. The original departmental regulations provided
that no lease would be authorized under the 1930 act unless it was
necessary to offset or prevent drainage and loss to the Govern-
ment 3 This provision, however, was deleted from the 1946 revision
of the regulations, 9 and in a case involving the rights of Phillips
Petroleum Company in a railroad right of way the Department
ruled that minerals underlying the right of way on federal lands
are not included in a 1920 act lease, but may be developed only
under the provisions of the 1930 act; and the right of way may be
leased regardless of the status of ownership of the oil and gas in the
adjoining land.4 0 The right of way involved in the Phillips case was
an easement only, and the same ruling would apply a fortiori where
the right of way is a determinable fee.
The 1930 act gives the railroad the exclusive right to make
application for a lease of the right of way, and the lease is given to
the railroad unless a higher bid of compensatory royalty is made by
the adjoining owner or lessee. Thus, while the railroad is determined
not to be the owner of the oil and gas, it does have the exclusive
right to acquire the oil and gas rights as lessee.
The result of the Union Pacific decision, then, is to leave the
railroad without title to the oil and gas in any part of the right of
way; to leave undetermined the title to the minerals underlying
the right of way where it crosses land now held by private owners;
to determine the mineral ownership is in the United States where
the right of way is on public land; and to give the railroad a leasing
privilege, at least where the right of way crosses federal land, and
if the United States owns the minerals in other sections also, then
for its entire length.
a, MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1941).
88 53 I.D. 137 (1930).
89 43 C.F.R. 200.80 to 200.87 (1954).
'o Phillips Petroleum Co., 61 I.D. 93 (1953), aff'd, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McKay (Dist. Ct. for
D.C., No. 5024-53, June 17, 1955).
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